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The growing up of global institutional investors is an important trend in the 
financial field in the past thirty years. According to the statistical data until 2009, 
institutional investors have accounted for half of the circulated market equity in the 
capital market, and up to sixty percent of the listed companies have institutional 
investors as their first ten greatest shareholders. Do institutional investors possess 
ability of corporate governance in our country? It is a new topic which needs urgent 
research in the corporate governance field. 
Which role do institutional investors play in corporate governance, “effective 
monitor”, “onlooker”, or “colluder”? From the existed academic results, we can see 
that scholars have tried to explore the role institutional investors play in corporate 
governance from all points and directions. However, due to the different manage 
segments and data periods; the conclusion may be completely opposite. In the view of 
the fact that the research on institutional investors and corporate governance is not 
comprehensive enough, and there still be blank in many aspects. Therefore, we think 
it is necessary to choose a new research point in order to enrich academic 
achievements about institutional investors’ role in corporate governance.  
By use of A-share listed companies in the period of the year 2004 and 2009 as 
research sample, this paper empirically tests the impact of institutional investors on 
the decision of non-voluntary management turnover and succession, to confirm the 
role of institutional investors in corporate governance. The results show that, the more 
institution investors hold shares, the sensitivity of management turnover to accounting 
performance is lower. Furthermore, even after management turnover, Inside 
succession is more likely for firms with more institutional investors share-holding. We 
document performance improvements subsequent to non voluntary turnover and 
outside succession, while changes in earnings performance are not significant for 
inside succession. All these results illuminates that institutional investors play the role 
of management’s “colluder” in non-voluntary turnover and succession. Grouping 
sample results show that Institutional Investors have only impact on CEO turnover 
and succession, not on the chairman of board. Moreover, the higher the firm’s 
ownership concentration is, the influence of institutional Investors is more 
insignificant.  
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第一章  导论 



















                                                 
① 本文作者根据 WIND 数据库相关数据整理得出。 
② 2002 年 7 月，中兴通讯提出到香港市场增发 H 股的方案。由于 A 股市盈率远高于 H 股市盈率，增
发 H 股将会摊薄 A 股股东回报，因此这一方案招致了以基金为首的机构投资者的强烈反对。 终，公司董
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